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Abstract 
Public participation is often presented as a virtue (a normative good), but the strategy comes 
with its own mechanical flaws. Policy debates and the literature have for a long time been 
dominated by this idea of public participation as a virtue, but recently the literature has become 
more critical addressing the instrumental and substantive aspects of public participation. This 
article engages with and adds to the literature by presenting the use of public participation in 
implementing the European Water Framework Directive in the Netherlands. The study traces and 
discusses a number of mechanistic issues related to public participation.  
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The Mechanics of Virtue: Lessons on Public Participation from Implementing the Water 
Framework Directive in the Netherlands1 
 
Introduction 
Public participation is often viewed as being an ‘all good thing’ – a virtue. To quote Sherry 
Arnstein’s seminal article on the topic: “The idea of citizen participation is a little like eating 
spinach: no one is against it in principle because it is good for you” (Arnstein, 1969, 216). In 
general, public participation is considered a strategy to increase the legitimacy and democracy 
of the public policy-making process and its outcomes – policies. The literature further reports on 
increased effectiveness, efficiency and quality of policies that have been developed and 
implemented after a process of public participation. Following on from such positive findings, 
public participation is gaining increased attention all over the world (for illustrations discussed in 
this journal, see among others Collins & Ison, 2009; Newig & Fritsch, 2009a; Tsang, Burnett, 
Hills, & Welford, 2009; Whitmarsh, Swartling, & Jäger, 2009). The European Commission (EC), 
for instance, considers public participation as key for interest representation, especially in 
environmental and water policy (e.g. EC, 2000, 2001; EC, 2003a, 2003b). Even more, to 
overcome a low level of public participation in the early 2000s (Greenwood, 2003), the EC has 
mandated its Member States to ensure public participation in the implementation of the Water 
Framework Directive (WFD) – an EC Directive that aims to improve water quality throughout 
Europe. 
 This article critically reviews the role of public participation in policy making and policy 
implementation. It brings together an existing literature on public participation and finds that 
this body of work is dominated by normative virtue-laden discussions, which overshadow the 
discussions that address the mechanics of public participation. The present article aims to 
engage with and add to discussions on whether public participation is indeed an ‘all good thing’. 
This is of particular relevance since the normative discussions appear biased in presenting public 
participation as an ‘all good thing’ only, whereas technical and functional arguments highlight its 
potential shortcomings in terms of effectiveness. A better understanding of the technical and 
functional aspects of public participation may help policy makers to make more informed 
decisions on the use of public participation.  
 The article is structured as follows. We begin with a discussion of the current literature 
on public participation, specifically focused on public participation in environmental policies. We 
then examine the technical and substantive literature on public participation by considering 
public participation in the implementation of the WFD in the Netherlands. The case is of 
particular interest as the traditional corporatist system of public interest representation in this 
country (Woldendorp & Keman, 2007) does at first glance seem unsuitable for a more pluralist 
strategy as public participation (Greenwood, 2003). The study is based on a series of in-depth 
interviews (n=53) and an online survey questionnaire (n=298). Presenting a single country case 
study has limitations, however. Although we highlight many of the issues related to public 
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participation and contrast these with findings in other countries, we do not claim empirical 
generalisability of findings. Building on this critical case (Gerring, 2007), we are, however, able 
to conclude this paper by highlighting a number of potential shortfalls of public participation, 
and the problems that may result from a top-down demand for public participation by higher 
levels to lower levels of government. 
 
Public participation as a virtue and as a mechanism2 
As with many contested concepts, public participation means different things to 
different people – and it is expected to result in different outcomes by different people. Broadly, 
the relevant literature may be divided into debates that consider public participation as a virtue 
and debates that consider it as a mechanism. The former debates are mostly normative and 
hold that “participation is just the right thing to do”, while the latter underline the instrumental 
and substantive aspects of public participation and aim to understand whether “it is a better 
way to achieve particular ends”, and “leads to better ends” (Stirling, 2004, 220 - emphasis in 
original). 
 
Public participation as a virtue 
The debates on public participation as a virtue “rest on principles of democratic 
emancipation, equity, equality and social justice” (Stirling, 2004, 220). This perspective may be 
traced back to Sherry Arnstein’s seminal article in which she introduced the, now famous, 
“Ladder of Citizen Participation” (Arnstein, 1969, 217). Arnstein distinguishes processes that are 
empty rituals from processes expected to have actual benefit. Low in her ladder of citizen 
participation we find ‘manipulation’ and ‘therapy’ – forms of participation that are at best paper 
constructs but de facto do not give the public any influence on the policy making or 
implementation process. In the middle of her ladder we find ‘informing’, ‘consultation’ and 
‘placation’ – forms of participation that do allow citizens to state their opinions, and do not 
require power holders to include the voice of citizens in their policies. At the top of the ladder 
we find ‘partnerships’, ‘delegated power’ and ‘citizen control’, forms of participation that 
actually transfer some power from governments to citizens. Over the years this ladder has been 
criticized and refined (e.g. Collins & Ison, 2009; Irvin & Stansbury, 2004; Konisky & Beierle, 2001; 
Webler & Tuler, 2006), but Arnstein’s general distinction between empty rituals and true sharing 
of power still holds in this strand of the literature. 
Within the virtue-laden or normative debates public participation is generally 
considered to increase legitimacy of the policy making process or its implementation, and to 
improve the general public’s acceptance of the outcome of this process. In environmental 
policies, particularly, citizen involvement and the sharing of powers between authorities and 
citizens is considered important as these policies often directly impact on citizens’ day-to-day 
lives (Bischop & Davis, 2002; Dryzek, 1990; Giddens, 2000; Gutmann & Thompson, 2004; Healy, 
1993; Offe, 1984). Following on from Arnstein, the empirical literature aims to provide evidence 
whether, or to what extent, public participation increases the level of democracy and the 
legitimacy of the policies developed and implemented. Yet, evidencing democracy or legitimacy 
comes with serious methodological constraints (cf. Black, 2008; Dryzek, 1990), let alone 
evidencing a causal association between public participation and higher levels of democracy and 
legitimacy. Empirical evidence for more democracy or legitimacy is often indirectly constructed 
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based on studies of the mechanical side of public participation (e.g. Brody, Godschalk, & Burby, 
2003; Irvin & Stansbury, 2004). 
 
Public participation as a mechanism 
The debates that consider public participation as a mechanism have a strong focus on 
the impact of public participation on the effectiveness of the policy making and implementation 
process (e.g. Collins & Ison, 2009; Newig & Fritsch, 2009a; Owens & Cowell, 2011) – sometimes 
referred to as output legitimacy (e.g. Hagberg, 2010; Newig & Fritsch, 2009b).  
The literature in these debates that consider instrumental aspects of public participation 
questions whether or not public participation does indeed involve stakeholders who are 
normally difficult to reach, whether citizens actually have access to the participation process and 
whether citizens have sufficient knowledge and means to participate successfully (e.g. Chess & 
Purcell, 1999; Konisky & Beierle, 2001; Selman, 1998, 2001). This, for instance, takes into 
consideration whether information was openly available and readily shared, or whether a 
rational argumentation and dialogue between citizens, professionals and public officials was 
enabled (e.g. Barber & Bartlet, 2007; Gutmann & Thompson, 2004; Webler & Tuler, 2006; 
Wiklund, 2005). Some find that public participation does promote public involvement and 
citizen engagement (e.g. Brody et al., 2003), whereas others find that it often falls short due to, 
for example, a lack of trust by citizens in governments (e.g. Irvin & Stansbury, 2004), or a feeling 
of not being taken seriously (Lukensmeyer & Torres, 2006). Furthermore, even if trust in 
governments is enhanced during the policy making or implementation process, this is no 
guarantee that such trust will remain in later stages (Petts, 2008).  
Besides discussing the potential merits of public participation in terms of efficiency, this 
strand of the literature is critical. It considers the danger of capture, or a disproportional 
representation of small groups in the process (Baiocchi, 2005). This literature is also concerned 
with the costs of public participation in terms of time and money (Rowe & Frewer, 2005). 
The literature that addresses the substantive aspects of public participation examines 
whether public participation does result in policies of a higher quality, and to what extent these 
policies are more easily accepted by the general public (e.g. Brody et al., 2003; Irvin & 
Stansbury, 2004). In addition, the literature considers the possibility that public participation 
speeds up the policy-making or implementation process; and that it uses less resources, or 
allocates these in a more efficient way than policies which have developed or have been 
implemented without public participation (Agger, 2010; Evans, Joas, Sundback, & Thobald, 
2006). Moreover, this literature highlights the learning effect of public participation (Collins & 
Ison, 2009; Petts, 2007; Whitmarsh et al., 2009). For instance, participants may gain more 
knowledge about the policy and its goals, which may help them comply with the policy once it is 
implemented (Newig & Fritsch, 2009a). 
This strand of the literature assesses public participation as well. It considers the 
watering down of policy outcomes, or of compromising the process instead of taking brave 
decisions (Aguilar-Fernandez, 2004; Coglianese, 1999). The latter issue is particularly relevant in 
environmental policy where often tradeoffs have to be made between economic, social and 
environmental concerns (Dryzek, 2005). Susana Aguilar-Fernandez (2004, 164) frames this as a 
“participation trap”: a situation where citizens or social groups decide not to participate, or after 
a well-organised participation process the majority decide not to support the environmental 
policy initiative in favour of economic considerations. Responsible politicians would, based on 
this process, choose not to implement the initiative, which may have a negative impact on the 
overall environmental policy in their jurisdiction – and hence a negative impact on the 
jurisdiction’s natural environment. An undemocratic, but from an environmental awareness 
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point of view, preferable approach would be if politicians acted as forerunners and 
implemented the policy without consultation. 
Traditionally, the virtue-laden normative perspective dominates the literature on public 
participation (cf. Stirling, 2004). This leaves uncertainty: under what circumstances, where and 
why may we expect public participation processes to result in more efficient policies of a higher 
quality? The following sections aim to engage with and add to the literature that consider public 
participation as a mechanism. 
 
Case study: public participation in the European Water Framework Directive 
The history and content of the European Water Framework Directive (WFD) have been 
discussed at great length in this journal (e.g. Beunen, van der Knaap, & Biesbroek, 2009; 
Demetropoulou et al., 2010; Hare, 2011; van Overveld, Hermans, & Verliefde, 2010) and 
elsewhere (e.g. Kaika & Page, 2003; Kallis & Butler, 2001; Page & Kaika, 2003)3. In short, the 
WFD aims at a ‘good ecological status’ and ‘good chemical status’ for waters in Europe by the 
deadline of 22 December 2015 (EC, 2000, annex V and IX). The WFD is EC legislation that the 
Member States need to follow, but there is much freedom as to how to meet the goals set. This 
allows Member States to develop and implement policies suitable to local factors. 
 For our study, it is relevant to note that the WFD was, when implemented, the first 
piece of EC legislation that forced the Member States to ensure public participation in the 
policy-making process of these new water policies (cf. Newig, Pahl-Wostl, & Sigel, 2005). 
 
Public participation in the WFD 
Preamble 14 to the WFD clearly provides a rationale for public participation: ‘The 
success of [the WFD] relies on close cooperation and coherent action at Community, Member 
State and local level as well as on information, consultation and involvement of the public, 
including users’ (EC, 2000: 2). The actual requirement for Member States to ensure public 
participation is laid down in WFD Article 14: ‘public information and consultation’(EC, 2000: 16). 
Article 14 mentions three forms of public participation: information supply, consultation and 
active involvement. Information supply and consultation have to be guaranteed by the Member 
States; active involvement is encouraged but not required by the EC (EU Working Group on 
Public Participation, 2002: 17).  
 Article 14 leaves much room for interpretation by the Member States – as do many 
provisions of the WFD. Various working groups have drawn up so-called implementation 
strategies aiming to support Member States in the implementation of the WFD. The EU Working 
Group on Public Participation defines public participation as: ‘allowing people to influence the 
outcome of plans and working processes’ (EU Working Group on Public Participation, 2002: 19). 
According to this Working Group, ‘the main purpose for public participation is to improve 
decision-making, by ensuring that decisions are soundly based on shared knowledge, 
experiences and scientific evidence, that decisions are influenced by the views and experience 
of those affected by them, that innovative and creative options are considered and that new 
arrangements are workable, and acceptable to the public’ (EU Working Group on Public 
Participation, 2002: 21). 
 For the Member States the open-ended structure of Article 14 results in two major 
issues. First, it does not state who should be involved in this process of public participation – it 
refers to ‘all interested parties in the implementation of [the WFD]’ (EC, 2000: 16). Second, the 
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WFD does not pre-determine at what scale public participation should take place. Nevertheless, 
from Article 14 it may be concluded that public participation is relevant at all scales where 
activities take place to implement the WFD – the areas where actual measures are taken, but 
also areas where the impact of such measures are felt (cf. EU Working Group on Public 
Participation, 2002: 26). 
To summarise, the EC requires the use of participation by its Member States. The 
rationale for doing so seems highly based on an assumption that public participation will 
improve the effectiveness of the policies to be developed and implemented under the WFD, in 
addition to creating legitimacy for these policies (cf. Hagberg, 2010; Newig & Fritsch, 2009b).  
 
Public participation in practice: implementing the WFD in the Netherlands 
In what follows, we discuss how this ‘forced public participation’ was dealt with in the 
Netherlands, whilst implementing the WFD. Studying the actual process of public participation 
in this country is of relevance. The Netherlands is traditionally characterised by a corporatist 
structure of interest representation (Woldendorp & Keman, 2007). Public participation, 
however, may be characterised as a strategy that has its base in pluralist systems of interest 
representation (e.g. Greenwood, 2003). Studying public participation in the Netherlands is, 
therefore, expected to provide unique insights into many of the day-to-day issues policy makers 
and public officials and representatives may encounter when engaging in public participation. 
These are insights less likely to be found in countries where a tradition of pluralist interest 
representation prevails – e.g. the southern European countries, US, UK or Australia (Damgaard 
& Eliassen, 1978; Pallesen, 2006). The study presented may be considered a critical case 
(Gerring, 2007). Where relevant, we compare our findings with those from other countries 
concerning public participation in the WFD implementation process. 
 
Research approach and methodology 
The research presented here is part of a larger study commissioned by the Dutch 
Ministry of Traffic, Public Works and Water Management into the implementation of the WFD in 
the Netherlands (ten Heuvelhof et al., 2010). One of the aspects covered in this study is public 
participation. We carried out the study between January and July 2010, and used a four-step 
approach for data collection and validation of findings. 
 First, to gain insight into the 10-year implementation period of the WFD, we carried out 
an extensive analysis of policy documents, working papers, internal memoranda, minutes of 
meetings and other grey literature. Based on this review, we drew up a timeline and topic list of 
issues that appeared to have had a major impact on the implementation of the WFD in the 
Netherlands. In short, we composed a story-line of the implementation (see Venesson, 2008: 
235), and discussed this and the topic list in three interviews with major players of the 
implementation process – a former director at the Dutch Ministry of Traffic, Public Works and 
Water Management responsible for the implementation of the WFD, a key representative of 
non-governmental organisations and a former Dutch lobbyist at the EC. 
 Second, based on the story-line, topic list and interviews, we carried out a series of 50 
elite interviews with key players in the implementation process, who were selected from a long 
list of key players provided by the Dutch Ministry of Traffic, Public Works and Water 
Management. These interviews were semi-structured and open-ended (McCracken, 1988; 
Richards, 1996). We targeted three groups of interviewees representing a wide range of 
stakeholders at national, regional and local levels. The interviews aimed at gaining insight into 
the interviewees’ experiences with the WFD implementation. Interviews were analysed using a 
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structured coding scheme; inter-coder reliability tests were carried out by the various 
researchers involved (cf. Seale & Silverman, 1997; Silverman, 2001). 
 Third, the interviews provided input for an online survey questionnaire (cf. Wright, 
2005). We targeted a wide range of actors involved in the implementation process; public 
officials at various levels of government, private sector and NGO-representatives, interest group 
representatives, and the like. Potential respondents were selected by requesting e-mail 
addresses of certain groups and individuals from the Dutch Ministry of Traffic, Public Works and 
Water Management, using snowball-sampling and browsing the Internet for addresses. We 
contacted 1172 persons, of whom 298 filled out the questionnaire (response: 25.4%). 
 Finally, based on an analysis of both quantitative and qualitative data, we drew up an 
interim research report. Findings from this report were presented and discussed in three expert 
meetings. Key actors from government, NGOs and other stakeholder organisations and interest 
groups joined these meetings – some of them had been interviewed at an earlier stage of the 
research. During the expert meetings findings were discussed and validated. Additional data 
from the meetings were processed in the final analysis. 
 
Pre-WFD institutional structure of water policy in the Netherlands 
The Netherlands is well known for its long history of water policy. Over the years –  
indeed, centuries – a complex institutional structure has developed (for good overviews of the 
history of Dutch water policy and past and current institutional structure see, Havekes, 
Koemans, Lazaroms, Poos, & Uijterlinde, 2004; Kuks, 2002). The institutional structure at the 
moment of our research was (Havekes, et al., 2004; Kuks, 2002): 
- At the national level, the Ministry of Traffic, Public Works and Water Management4 is 
responsible for coordination of water policies, for the main (navigable) rivers, coastal 
waters and estuaries, territorial seas and a major inland lake – the IJsselmeer. 
Interestingly, this Ministry is responsible for supervising water quantity management, 
whereas the Ministry of Housing, Urban Planning and the Environment is responsible for 
supervising water quality management – coordination of water quality and water 
quantity management is in the hands of the former Ministry. 
- At the regional level, the Provinces (12) and Water Boards (26) have responsibilities. 
Water Boards are responsible for regional waters – with exemption of some local waters 
– and have a specific position within the Dutch administrative structure. These are some 
of the oldest public authorities in the Netherlands. Each Water Board has its own 
governing body – representatives of farmers, land owners, owners of buildings and 
inhabitants – and financing structure through taxes. The Provinces are responsible for 
the planning of water storage areas and advising the national government on water 
safety. The Provinces are, furthermore, responsible for setting up, or discontinuing, 
Water Boards, and making rules for controlling them. 
- At the local level, Municipalities (about 470) are responsible for local waters such as 
harbours and urban canal systems. They are also responsible for sewerage networks in 
their jurisdiction. In carrying out their tasks, Municipalities often work in close 
collaboration with the Water Boards and Provinces. 
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 This was the name of the responsible Ministry when we carried out our research. After the 2010 
elections, a new Ministry became responsible for water policy in the Netherlands: the Ministry of 
Infrastructure and the Environment. The latter Ministry combines the former ministry of Traffic, Public 
Works and Water Management and the Ministry of Housing, Urban Planning and the Environment. 
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The administrative boundaries of all these hierarchically organised authorities are 
aligned – e.g. the Water Boards are situated within the Provinces, as are the Municipalities. This 
implies that over the years working relationships have developed between the various levels of 
administration. With the implementation of the WFD this changed due to the introduction of a 
new administrative structure around the geographical location of water bodies. This suggests 
that various organisations had to build new working relationships. 
 Finally, besides the abovementioned authorities, we need to consider briefly some other 
actors, in order to understand better the Dutch institutional structure of water policy. These are: 
- The Association of Water Boards: an organisation that aims to promote the interests of 
Water Boards at national and international level. This association has a close 
relationship with the national government. 
- The Association of Provinces of the Netherlands: an organisation that aims to promote 
the interests of Provinces at national and European level. This association has a close 
relationship with the national government and various interest groups.  
- The Association of Dutch Municipalities: an organisation that aims to promote the 
interests of Municipalities at national and European level. Like the above, this 
association has a close relationship with the national government. 
 
Implementing the WFD and public participation in the Netherlands 
The above discussion of the Dutch institutional structure of water policy underlined the 
traditional Dutch corporatist system of interest representation – interest representation is put 
into practice by a small number of organisations, which are hierarchically ordered and 
recognised by the Dutch national government (cf. Schmitter, 1977). However, there is no direct 
representation of the public in this structure, as was required by the EC. How then has the 
Netherlands met the EC’s requirement for public participation, and especially the involvement 
of the general public? In order to understand how the Ministry of Water, Public Works and 
Water Management (from here on referred to as the Ministry) has dealt with this issue, we have 
to look closely at the implementation structure. 
 The Ministry has introduced a complex organisational structure to implement the WFD. 
This was necessary to bring together all relevant stakeholders from the former institutional 
structure of water policy in the Netherlands into the new WFD structure. Furthermore, the 
Ministry quickly understood that it had insufficient expertise to implement the WFD itself. 
Figure 1 (page 9) represents the organisational structure. 
Put simply, the organisational structure for the implementation of the WFD in the 
Netherlands consists of a set of columns: a national column and seven regional columns. This 
structure was designed and implemented by the Ministry in collaboration with the relevant 
stakeholders. The national column was the arena for debates between representatives of 
national associations, ministerial departments and the Secretary of State responsible for the 
WFD implementation. The top of this column is key in interest representation: it is here that 
representatives of national associations have direct contact with the Secretary of State. All other 
layers of this column may be considered preparatory – i.e., the two lower layers (Associations & 
Ministries and the Preparatory Committee) provided input for the debates at the top of the 
column; the theme groups provided input to the Preparatory Committee; and the Working 
Group provided input to the Theme Groups. Interestingly, a separate arena was organised in 
parallel with the top of the national column. Here, we find an arena in which national interest 
groups (i.e., industry, commerce, nature and environment and leisure) advise the Secretary of 
State on the implementation of the WFD. 
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Figure 1 – simplified overview of Dutch WFD implementation structure 
(Source: Ten Heuvelhof et al., 2010: 40) 
 
 
 
The regional columns were the arenas for debates on regional and local level. In these columns 
we find a regular debate between the chairs of the columns and the Secretary of State. The 
columns themselves are governed by administrators in the Provinces and Water Boards. These 
administrators take decisions on the implementation at regional and local level. In doing so, 
they are supported by civil servants from their own organisations. These are, in their turn, 
supported by Product Teams – comparable with the Theme Groups in the national column. A 
specific role is assigned to Feedback Groups – a mixture of representatives of prominent land 
owners (mostly nature and environmental conservancy organisations) and interest groups (i.e., 
industry, agriculture, commerce, leisure). The formal function of these groups was to provide 
input to the Product Teams.  
 This implementation structure clearly shows the understanding of the relevance of 
Article 14 of the WFD (public participation) in the Netherlands: interest representation is 
organised at various levels. Besides this formal structure, two other approaches were chosen to 
meet the EC’s demands for public participation: three moments of consultation (as mandated by 
the EC) and 140 so-called ‘Area Processes’ involving citizens and local interest groups in the WFD 
implementation process.  
  
Experiences with involving ‘the public’ 
Citizens (or to use the Working Group on Public Participation’s wording, ‘the public’) 
faced a high level of information supply through websites, newsletters, brochures and seven 
information meetings throughout the Netherlands. Active involvement of citizens through 
consultation was limited, nevertheless. Although they had the opportunity to join Area 
Processes and visit the information meetings, few did so – similar findings are reported in a 
study on the implementation of the WFD in the Czech Republic (Slavíková & Jílková, 2011). An 
anecdote is illustrative here. One of our interviewees recalled one of these meetings. Twelve 
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people attended, but eleven of them were professionally involved in the WFD implementation. 
When they quizzed the twelfth person, they found that she was one of our researchers (in an 
earlier position), who had joined the meeting out of research interest. In short, no citizen 
attended the particular meeting, and interviewees recalled similar experiences with the other 
meetings. On this point, the interviewees shared an opinion that citizens are not interested in 
complex water issues as long as these are vague and contained in policy papers only. They start 
caring about such issues once they are implemented – e.g. once their house has to be 
demolished because of the construction of a dyke. 
 Our interviewees were critical of the success of the active involvement of citizens in the 
WFD implementation. At the same time they wondered whether and how citizens in general 
should be involved in the WFD implementation. When asked whether citizens should be more 
involved in the policy-making process, a majority of administrators and civil servants stated they 
should not (52%, n=96), whereas a majority of interest group representatives stated they should 
(60%, n=39). 
The chosen approach to involve the public, town-hall meetings and printed 
documentation, seem out of date. In addition to these traditional approaches, much 
information was provided through websites. Web-based public participation is generally 
considered an improvement on traditional public participation. Yet, web-based public 
participation is proven to be limited when potential participants have restricted or no Internet 
access, have partial knowledge of operating computers and navigating websites, or the interface 
of the website is too complex (Stern, Gudes, & Svoray, 2009). Besides, the Dutch websites 
provided little or no opportunities for citizens to voice their opinions as they were informational 
mostly. As Bischop and Davis have already noted, information campaigns are ‘hardly meaningful 
participation, since the flow is only one-way’ (Bischop & Davis, 2002: 20).  
The Dutch example of citizen involvement is comparable with other European 
experiences. For instance, in certain areas of Serbia, survey questionnaires were sent to 
inhabitants. Yet, researchers are uncertain of the success of this approach to public 
participation, which may partly have to do with survey respondents’ disinterest in the wider 
goals of the WFD (Trajekovic, Kolakovic, & Ignjatovic, 2005). Another example comes from a 
study on public participation in Germany (Kampa, Kranz, & Hansen, 2003). Interestingly, the 
German study provides comparable examples of approaches to public participation in the 
Netherlands (information supply through the Internet; Feedback Groups) and to those we 
present. The researchers note that ‘[f]ormal consultation procedures have been mostly geared 
down toward organised groups rather than the general public’, and report limited involvement 
of the general public (Kampa et al., 2003: 52). 
 
Experiences with involving ‘stakeholders’ 
Dutch interviewees were critical as well of the role of Feedback Groups. Participants of 
Feedback Groups mentioned the ‘cosmetic’ role of their consultation. As one of our 
interviewees put it: ‘our comments were added to formal policy documents, but are not 
reflected in policy’. Similar experiences are reported with regard to the implementation of the 
WFD in the German Hase area. In this study, a water supplier representative points out that ‘it is 
politically desirable for federal authorities to assign tasks [to stakeholders]; however, at the 
same time, the federal authority obviously wants to keep control of the winding-up’. In the view 
of this water supplier, this results in ‘a construct of cooperation that, as soon as one tries to get 
in, is characterised by half-heartedness and inconsequence’ (Kastens & Newig, 2008, 35). A 
further study on the implementation of the WFD in the UK is concerned with the authority and 
actual impact stakeholder groups have on the policy decisions made (Woods, 2008). 
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These findings directly relate to what Arnstein (1969) refers to as ‘empty rituals’. 
Although it is an easy way to be involved in the policy process, stakeholders in the role of 
consultees do not have to affect the outcome of the process per se (Arnstein, 1969; Jordan & 
Richardson, 1987). Also, the frustrations of our interviewees sounded somewhat familiar: 
‘participation without redistribution of power is an empty and frustrating process for the 
powerless’ (Arnstein, 1969: 216). Arnstein clearly places informing and consultation in the 
category of tokenism: ‘the groundrules allow have-nots to advise, but retain for the 
powerholders the continued right to decide’ (Arnstein, 1969: 217). 
 Within the Dutch case participants (stakeholder representatives) were, furthermore, 
frustrated by the fact that they had to attend many meetings in different policy arenas, which 
provided severe staffing problems for the smaller interest groups. In this respect, the complex 
implementation structure with a wide range of formal consultation platforms negatively affects 
public participation; when interest groups cannot represent themselves and use their voice, 
they are not heard. As one of the interviewees noticed: ‘for staffless interest groups there is a 
lot of pressure on its members, especially given the strict timeframe and the ocean of 
documents we had to deal with’. This comment reflects earlier findings on stakeholder 
commitment and special misfits (Hagberg, 2010; Young, 2002): interest groups are organised 
along spatial boundaries that may not match the politically set boundaries of the particular 
policy. The earlier cited study of  the German Hase area mentions comparable complications for 
stakeholders (Kastens & Newig, 2008), as does a study on the implementation of the WFD in 
Sweden (Lundqvist, 2004). 
 Besides critique of this formal structure by stakeholder representatives, concerns were 
expressed as to the language of the documents produced. The language of the WFD is highly 
legal and technical and has continued to be so in some of the Dutch policy documentation. A 
study on the implementation of the WFD in the Czech Republic highlights similar difficulties for 
stakeholder representatives: ‘The big problem is the structure of the information published … 
many documents are not written in a common language, they contain legal formulas and 
hydrological expressions, and some of them are quite long. Therefore, the goals of the planning 
(the vision) are not clear and it is time-consuming to find out what is the real impact of the 
public or stakeholders’ (Slavíková & Jílková, 2011, 554). 
In the Netherlands, the most severe criticism relates to the variety of Area Processes. 
The Water Boards were responsible for the initialisation of these processes. Yet, early on in the 
WFD implementation process, the Water Boards questioned what exactly was meant by public 
participation, who should be involved and at what level. As a consequence of the variety of Area 
Processes, different results are reported. Criticism (again) related to the time it takes for interest 
group representatives to attend the various meetings related to the implementation of the WFD 
in the Netherlands. Finally, severe criticism was levelled at the different actors involved in such 
Area Processes. Bringing together a wide range of stakeholders makes it difficult to reach 
agreement on issues, and agreements are, ultimately, watered downed compromises between 
actors. Especially in terms of water policy, the wishes and needs of different interest groups 
might clash; for instance, those of farmers and ecologists. Respondents wonder whether this 
type of intensive consultation should be used in future policy-making processes (48%, n=116, 
think it should). 
When asked whether the Dutch WFD policies reflect the voice of interest groups, or 
stakeholders in the terminology of the Working Group on Public Participation, a majority of 
administrators and civil servants state they do (respectively 81%, n=13; and 74%, n=123). 
However, a majority of representatives of these interest groups feel these policies do not reflect 
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their views (59%, n=40) – a statistically significant difference between the groups (Chi2=24.415; 
df=2; p<0.001; Cramer’s V=0.321).  
Discussion and conclusion 
Striving for more democracy, legitimacy, effectiveness, or efficiency, public participation 
is often implemented as – and assumed to be – a strategy for the common good. All these are 
undisputable virtues policy makers should strive for, and are widely regarded as elements of 
effective governance. Applying public participation in policy-making and implementation 
processes is, however, no guarantee that any of these virtues will be achieved – let alone all of 
them. 
 In this article we reviewed the public participation literature and contrasted the virtue-
laden normative debates on public participation with the debates that consider public 
participation as a mechanism. As we highlighted, the former debates theorise about public 
participation from the points of view of legitimacy and democracy, whereas the latter debates 
address effectiveness gains that may be achieved. Many studies have highlighted the difficult 
tradeoff policy makers face between criteria, such as legitimacy and democracy on the one 
hand, and efficiency on the other (the classics are: Habermas, 1976; in relation to the WFD, see 
Hagberg, 2010; Newig & Fritsch, 2009b; Offe, 1984). These studies demonstrate that a single 
strategy, for example, public participation, is unlikely to solve the tradeoffs and do ‘all good’ 
only. 
 The literature that addresses public participation as a mechanism does indeed highlight 
a number of issues that may result from the implementation of public participation: the process 
may be captured by an unrepresentative group of stakeholders; policy outcomes may be 
watered down, or unwanted given the original intentions; there may be mismatches between 
spatial boundaries of stakeholder representatives and the policy under development; and the 
process may be costly in terms of money and time for both policy makers and stakeholders. It is 
exactly these critiques that were reflected in the case study we presented – and once more 
comparable with other studies on the implementation of the Water Framework Directive. 
 To the growing body of literature that is critical to public participation, our study adds a 
number of findings. First, public participation may largely be considered a strategy that fits 
pluralist systems of interest representation. Implementing this strategy in a corporatist setting 
may result in severe difficulties. On the one hand, it may provide those already involved in 
interest groups an additional opportunity to express their voice – a danger of 
overrepresentation; on the other hand, the institutional capacity or knowledge may fail to utilise 
fully the possibility of public participation – a danger of technocratic application. In terms, 
specifically, of the European context, our study questions the value of forced public participation 
and its ability to improve the democracy and legitimacy of policy-making processes and policies. 
 Second, from the study, it is evident that de jure the Netherlands has succeeded in 
meeting the EC’s requirement for public participation. De facto, however, the Netherlands has 
failed to do so: interviewees and survey respondents feel that the active involvement of the 
public was unsuccessful, and the stakeholders themselves believe that their opinions are 
excluded from the policy documents resulting from the implementation process. This challenges 
our thinking on what criteria to use to call public participation successful.  
 Third, from our study and other studies we have discussed, serious questions arise 
about the actual value of an open public participation process in the implementation of a highly 
technological piece of policy. As the Dutch and other examples show, ordinary citizens appear to 
lack the willingness or do not see the need to participate actively in environmental issues that 
do not directly affect them. This calls for ongoing participation during different cycles of policy 
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development and implementation, tuned down to those who are, at that point in time, most 
affected.  
 To conclude, this paper critically addressed the use of public participation in policy-
making and implementation. An in-depth case study of the implementation of the WFD in the 
Netherlands was used to engage with and add to the literature that addresses public 
participation as a mechanism. We are aware of the caveats of our research approach: we 
addressed only one country in our study and we did not include individual citizens. Our focus 
was on interest groups and their representatives. More empirical research (cross-country, cross-
sectorial) on the mechanics of public participation is needed to gain a better understanding of 
when, where and how the strategy may indeed result in more democratic, legitimate and 
efficient policy outcomes. 
 
 
Van der Heijden & Ten Heuvelhof (2013) The mechanics of virtue – page 14 of 17 
 
References 
Agger, A. (2010). Involving citizens in sustainable development. Local Environment, 15(6), 541-
552. 
Aguilar-Fernandez, S. (2004). 'Sustainability is cool': rhetorical participatory discourse in the 
Spanish strategy for sustainable development. In W. Lafferty (Ed.), Governance for 
Sustainable Development (pp. 128-161). Cheltenhan: Edward Elgar. 
Arnstein, S. A. (1969). A ladder of citizen participation. JAIP, 35(4), 216-224. 
Baiocchi, G. (2005). Militants and citizens: The politics of participatory democracy in Porto 
Alegre. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Barber, W. F., & Bartlet, R. V. (2007). Problematic Participants in Deliberative Democracy: 
Experts, Social Movements, and Environmental Justice. International Journal of Public 
Administration, 30(1), 5-22. 
Beunen, R., van der Knaap, W. G. M., & Biesbroek, G. R. (2009). Implementation and integration 
of EU environmental directives. Experiences from The Netherlands. Environmental 
Policy and Governance, 19(1), 57-69. 
Bischop, P., & Davis, G. (2002). Mapping Public Participation in Policy Choices. Australian Journal 
of Public Administration, 61(1), 14-29. 
Black, J. (2008). Constructing and contesting legitimacy and accountability in polycentric 
regulatory regimes. Regulation & Governance, 2(2), 137-164. 
Bovens, M. (2010). Two Concepts of Accountability: Accountability as a Virtue and as a 
Mechanism. West European Politics, 33(5), 946-967. 
Brody, S. D., Godschalk, D. R., & Burby, R. J. (2003). Mandating Citizen Participation in Plan 
Making: Six Strategic Planning Choices. Journal of the American Planning Association, 
69(3), 245-264. 
Chess, C., & Purcell, K. (1999). Public Participation and the Environment. Environmental Science 
and Technology, 33(16), 2685-2692. 
Coglianese, C. (1999). The limits of consensus. Environment, 41(3), 28-33. 
Collins, K., & Ison, R. (2009). Jumping off Arnstein's ladder: social learning as a new policy 
paradigm for climate change adaptation. Environmental Policy and Governance, 19(6), 
358-373. 
Damgaard, E., & Eliassen, K. A. (1978). Corporate Pluralism in Danish Law-Making. Scandinavian 
Political Studies, 1(4), 285-313. 
Demetropoulou, L., Nikolaidis, N., Papadoulakis, V., Tsakiris, K., Koussouris, T., Kalogerakis, N., et 
al. (2010). Water framework directive implementation in Greece: Introducing 
participation in water governance – the Case of the Evrotas River Basin management 
plan. Environmental Policy and Governance, 20(5), 336-349. 
Dryzek, J. (1990). Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political science. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Dryzek, J. (2005). The Politics of the Earth - second edition. Oxford: Oxford Universtity Press. 
EC. (2000). Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 
2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy. Official 
Journal of the European Communities: European Communities. 
EC. (2001). Directive  2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 
2001on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the 
environmen. Official Journal of the European Communities: European Communities. 
EC. (2003a). Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 
2003 on public access to environmental information and repealing Council Directive 
90/313/EEC. Official Journal of the European Communities: European Communities. 
Van der Heijden & Ten Heuvelhof (2013) The mechanics of virtue – page 15 of 17 
 
EC. (2003b). Directive  2003/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 
2003 providing for public participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and 
programmes relating to the environment and amending with regard to public 
participation and access to justice Council Directives 85/337/EEC and 96/61/E. Official 
Journal of the European Communities: European Communities. 
EU Working Group on Public Participation. (2002). Guidance on Public Participation in Relation 
to the Water Framework Directive. Final Version after the Water Director's Meeting. 
December 2002. Brussels: EU (informal) Working Group on Public Participation. 
Evans, B., Joas, M., Sundback, S., & Thobald, K. (2006). Governing local sustainability. Journal of 
Environmental Planning and Management, 49(6), 849-867. 
Gerring, J. (2007). Case Study Research: Principles and Practices. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Giddens, A. (2000). The Third Way and its Critics. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Greenwood, J. (2003). Representing Interests in the European Union. Hampshire: Palgrave 
Mcmillan. 
Gutmann, A., & Thompson, D. F. (2004). Why deliberative democracy? Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Habermas, J. (1976). Legitimation Crisis. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Hagberg, L. (2010). Participation under administrative rationality: Implementing the EU Water 
Framework Directive in forestry. In K. Backstrand, J. Khan, A. Kronsell & E. Lovbrand 
(Eds.), Environmental Politics and Deliberative Governance (pp. 123-141). Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar. 
Hare, M. (2011). Forms of Participatory Modelling and its Potential for Widespread Adoption in 
the Water Sector. Environmental Policy and Governance, 21(6), 386-402. 
Havekes, H., Koemans, F., Lazaroms, R., Poos, D., & Uijterlinde, R. (2004). Water governance: the 
Dutch water board model. The Hague: Dutch Association of Water Boards. 
Healy, P. (1993). Planning through debate. In F. Fischer & J. Forester (Eds.), The argumentive 
turn in policy analysis and planning. London: Duke University Press. 
Irvin, R., & Stansbury, J. (2004). Citizen Participation in Decision Making: Is It Worth the Effort? 
Public Administration Review, 64(1), 55-65. 
Jordan, A. G., & Richardson, J. J. (1987). Government and pressure groups in Britain. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
Kaika, M., & Page, B. (2003). The EU Water Framework Directive: part 1. European policy-making 
and the changing topography of lobbying. European Environment, 13(6), 314-327. 
Kallis, G., & Butler, D. (2001). The EU water framework directive: measures and implications. 
Water Policy, 3(3), 125-142. 
Kampa, E., Kranz, N., & Hansen, W. (2003). Public Participation in River Basin Management in 
Germany. Berlin: Ecologic Institute for International and European Environmental Policy. 
Kastens, B., & Newig, J. (2008). Will participation foster the successful implementation of the 
water framework directive? Local Environment, 13(1), 27-41. 
Konisky, D., & Beierle, T. (2001). Innovations in Public Participation and Environmental Decision 
Making. Society and Natural Resources, 14(9), 815-826. 
Kuks, S. (2002). The Evolution of the National Water Regime in the Netherlands. Enschede: 
EUWARENESS/University of Twente. 
Lukensmeyer, C. J., & Torres, L. H. (2006). Public deliberation: a manager's guide to citizen 
engagement. Washington, DC: IBM Center for the Business of Government. 
Lundqvist, L. J. (2004). Integrating Swedish water resource management: a multi-level 
governance trilemma. Local Environment, 9(5), 413-424. 
Van der Heijden & Ten Heuvelhof (2013) The mechanics of virtue – page 16 of 17 
 
McCracken, G. (1988). The long interview (Vol. 13). London: Sage. 
Newig, J., & Fritsch, O. (2009a). Environmental governance: participatory, multi-level – and 
effective? Environmental Policy and Governance, 19(3), 197-214. 
Newig, J., & Fritsch, O. (2009b). More Input - Better Output: does citizen incolvement improve 
environmental governance? In I. Bluhdorn (Ed.), In Search of Legitimacy: Policy Making 
in Europe and the Challenge of Complexity. Opladen: Barbara Budrich Publishers. 
Newig, J., Pahl-Wostl, C., & Sigel, K. (2005). The Role of Public Participation in Managing 
Uncertainty in the Implementation of the Water Framework Directive. European 
Environment, 15(3), 333-343. 
Offe, C. (1984). Contradictions of the Welfare State. London: Huntchinson & Co. 
Owens, S., & Cowell, R. (2011). Land and Limits: Interpreting sustainability in the planning 
process. Abingdon: Routledge. 
Page, B., & Kaika, M. (2003). The EU Water Framework Directive: part 2. Policy innovation and 
the shifting choreography of governance. European Environment, 13(6), 328-343. 
Pallesen, T. (2006). Scandinavian Corporatism in Trans-Atlantic Comparative Perspective. 
Scandinavian Political Studies, 29(2), 131-145. 
Petts, J. (2007). Learning about learning: lessons from public engagement and deliberation on 
urban river restoration. The Geographical Journal, 173(4), 300-311. 
Petts, J. (2008). Public engagement to build trust: false hopes? Journal of Risk Research, 11(6), 
821-835. 
Richards, D. (1996). Elite Interviewing: Approaches and Pitfalls. Politics, 16(3), 199-204. 
Rowe, G., & Frewer, L. J. (2005). A Typology of Public Engagement Mechanisms. Science, 
Technology, and Human Values, 30(2), 251-290. 
Schmitter, P. C. (1977). Modes of Interest Intermediation and Models of Societal Change in 
Western Europe. Comparative Political Studies, 10(1), 7-38. 
Seale, C., & Silverman, D. (1997). Ensuring rigour in qualitative research. European Journal of 
Public Health, 7(4), 379-384. 
Selman, P. (1998). Local Agenda 21: substance or spin? Journal of Environmental Policy and 
Management, 41(5), 533-553. 
Selman, P. (2001). Social Capital, Sustainability and Environmental Planning. Planning Theory 
and Practice, 2(1), 13-30. 
Silverman, D. (2001). Interpreting Qualitative Data. 2nd edition. London: Sage. 
Slavíková, L., & Jílková, J. (2011). Implementing the Public Participation Principle into Water 
Management in the Czech Republic: A Critical Analysis. Regional Studies, 45(4), 545-557. 
Stern, E., Gudes, O., & Svoray, T. (2009). Web-based and traditional public participation in 
comprehensive planning. Environment and Planning B, 36(6), 1067-1085. 
Stirling, A. (2004). Opening up or closing down? Analysis, participation and power in the social 
appraisal of technology. In M. Leach, I. Scoones & B. Wynne (Eds.), Science and Citizens. 
Globalisation and the Challenge of Engagement (pp. 218-231). New Delhi: Orient 
Longman. 
ten Heuvelhof, E., van der Heijden, J., van der Arend, S., Broekhans, B., van Bueren, E., 
Harteveld, C., et al. (2010). Evaluatie van de implementatie van de Kaderrichtlijn Water. 
Delft: Technische Universiteit Delft. 
Trajekovic, S., Kolakovic, S., & Ignjatovic, M. (2005). Public opinion survey as a form of public 
participation in the implementation of Water Framework Directive. Facta Universitas, 
3(2), 173-183. 
Van der Heijden & Ten Heuvelhof (2013) The mechanics of virtue – page 17 of 17 
 
Tsang, S., Burnett, M., Hills, P., & Welford, R. (2009). Trust, public participation and 
environmental governance in Hong Kong. Environmental Policy and Governance, 19(2), 
99-114. 
van Overveld, P. J. M., Hermans, L. M., & Verliefde, A. R. D. (2010). The use of technical 
knowledge in European water policy-making. Environmental Policy and Governance, 
20(5), 322-335. 
Venesson, P. (2008). Case studies and process tracing: theories and practices. In D. Della Porta & 
M. Keating (Eds.), Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Webler, T., & Tuler, S. (2006). Four Perspectives on Public Participation Process in Environmental 
Assessment and Decision Making. Policy Studies Journal, 34(4), 699-722. 
Whitmarsh, L., Swartling, Å. G., & Jäger, J. (2009). Participation of experts and non-experts in a 
sustainability assessment of mobility. Environmental Policy and Governance, 19(4), 232-
250. 
Wiklund, H. (2005). In search of arenas for democratic deliberation: a Habermasian review of 
environmental assessment. Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal, 23(4), 281-292. 
Woldendorp, J., & Keman, H. (2007). The Polder Model Reviewed: Dutch Corporatism 1965-
2000. Economic and Industrial Democracy, 28(3), 317-347. 
Woods, D. (2008). Stakeholder involvement and public participation: a critique of Water 
Framework Directive arrangements in the United Kingdom. Water and Environment 
Journal, 22(4), 258-264. 
Wright, K. B. (2005). Researching Internet-Based Populations: Advantages and Disadvantages of 
Online Survey Research, Online Questionnaire Authoring Software Packages, and Web 
Survey Services. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 10(3), 00. doi: 
10.1111/j.1083-6101.2005.tb00259.x. 
Young, O. R. (2002). The institutional dimensions of environmental change: fit, interplay, and 
scale, global environmental accord. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
 
